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Kierkegaard’s ‘Repetition’ and Pilgrimage  
Volume 4(v) 2016 
A Personal Camino Story 
I climbed up the ladder to the top bunk and 
prepared for my first night on the Camino de 
Santiago. After squirming into my sleeping bag, 
I rolled a couple of bright orange, foamy 
earplugs between my fingers, and inserted them 
gently. As they expanded, the rustling sounds of 
my fellow travelers slowly faded until I was 
alone in muffled silence. I lay on my back and 
noticed for the first time the impressive lighting 
fixtures suspended overhead which supplied an 
inescapable spiritual image. There were dozens 
of very large halos hanging down from the 
towering ceiling and illuminating all the 
sleeping pilgrims. 
When the travel writer Pico Iyer first visited the 
paradisiacal island of Bali, Indonesia, he 
mistook the toxic, chemical smoke of mosquito 
coils for holy incense; and mistakenly 
attributed a whiff of clove cigarette smoke to 
the fragrance of flowers (Iyer, 1989). He 
supposed, however, that these false associations 
were the result of the truly magical context that 
Bali provides. I wondered whether magic 
awaited me if I simply learned to expect it. In 
Roncesvalles, as the halos of light above my 
bunk were slowly dimmed, I wondered what 
associations I would be making down the road. 
The pilgrimage did indeed cast its spell on me 
that year. The magic wasn’t there, however, 
when I returned four years later to repeat the 
experience. I took the same bus ride from 
Pamplona to Roncesvalles, the streets were 
similarly slick with rain, I was served virtually 
the same meal of pasta, trout and fries, and I 
slept in the same cavernous old monastery 
brimming with bunk beds. A couple of days 
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In 1843, the Danish philosopher Kierkegaard wondered whether it was possible to 
repeat an experience. He attempted to relive experiences he once had in Berlin by 
revisiting haunts of his earlier self. After several days, he concluded that his repetition of 
experience was unsuccessful. Many people make similar attempts at repetition when 
they make, for example, the pilgrimage to Camino de Santiago multiple times. What 
could a person hope to gain by this repetition?  
What prevents successful repetition, suggests Kierkegaard, is beginning with the end in 
mind rather than traveling merely to collect random impressions. Repetition fails, argues 
Kierkegaard, when it is tried as some kind of experiment rather than a commitment, and 
this failure of immersion makes us a passive observer of ourselves.  
An authentic repetition, he argues, can only happen after one surrenders control of 
events. One must give something up to get anything back. To experience Berlin again, 
or to repeat a pilgrimage, one must give up expectations and surrender to whatever 
unfolds. In this way, the repeat traveler would surrender the objective stance of someone 
comparing events with earlier ones. Instead, they would be actively engaged, and thus 
able to actually re-experience something like what happened before. In contrast to 
passively ‘recollecting’ past events, Kierkegaard advises that a successful ‘repetition’ is 
to live with a repeatedly renewed commitment to living in the present. Repetition is, 
paradoxically, not about the past but, rather, about ‘the earnestness of existence.’ 
Pilgrims, however, often try on identities and roles in attempts to experience what they 
have heard of in other pilgrim’s stories. It may be that some repeat pilgrims are not so 
much nostalgically reliving their previous experiences, as trying to experience what 
others have experienced, and that they themselves did not experience the first time. It 
will be argued that this imitation of life can never be fully engaged in, and thus, it will 
always be disappointing because it necessarily involves self-consciously observing 
oneself in the role. 
Key Words: Kierkegaard, repetition, pilgrimage, authenticity, repeatable pleasures, 
exhaustible pleasures, Camino de Santiago 
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Berlin again, or to repeat a pilgrimage, one must give 
up expectations and surrender to whatever unfolds. In 
this way, the repeat traveller would surrender the 
objective stance of someone comparing events with 
earlier ones. Instead, they would be actively engaged, 
and thus able to actually re-experience something like 
what happened before. In contrast to passively 
‘recollecting’ past events, Kierkegaard advises that a 
successful ‘repetition’ is to live with a repeatedly 
renewed commitment to living in the present. 
Repetition is, paradoxically, not about the past but, 
rather, about ‘the earnestness of existence.’ 
Pilgrimages are largely defined in terms of their target 
destination, and thus it seems, by definition, begin with 
the end in mind. There is always a special destination, 
such as Santiago de Compostella, or Lourdes. Thus, 
according to Kierkegaard’s criterion, it might be 
thought that there would be nothing to gain from 
repeating the experience. However, if one’s motivation 
for the pilgrimage is to transform oneself through 
voluntary hardship, or some other process of inner 
transformation, then this process is not diminished with 
repetition. 
Pilgrims, however, often exacerbate the problem of 
repletion by trying on identities and roles in attempts to 
experience what they have heard of in the stories of 
other pilgrims. It may be that some repeat pilgrims are 
not merely nostalgically reliving their previous 
experiences, as trying to experience what others have 
experienced, and that they themselves may not have 
experienced the first time. It will be argued that this 
imitation of life can never be fully engaged in, and 
thus, it will always be disappointing because it 
necessarily involves self-consciously observing oneself 
in the role. 
Kierkegaard’s Attempt at Repetition 
Kierkegaard also wondered whether it was possible to 
repeat an experience, and whether there might be 
‘anything gained or lost’ in the process. (Kierkegaard, 
1983: 131) So, he decided to conduct a psychological 
experiment and attempted to re-live some pleasant 
experiences he once had in Berlin. The results are 
described as  
an investigative journey . . . to test the 
possibility and meaning of repetition 
(Kierkegaard, 1983: 150). 
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later I walked back into Pamplona and tried 
hard to repeat other experiences and, similarly, 
failed to recapture their essence. I dined again 
in the Café Iruna frequented by Hemmingway, 
and made famous in his account of drunken 
debauchery The Sun Also Rises. I sat on the 
same bench and sketched the same bell-tower I 
had sketched years before. The second time 
around for these experiences was just not as 
inspiring. The exoticness of my first café con 
leche, or the thrill of my first tapas bar can only 
be experienced with fresh eyes. After 
completing the walk of 800 km I arrived in 
Santiago de Compostella - but not for the first 
time, and the second time around cannot 
compare. 
Introduction 
With the entire world to discover, tourists regularly 
return to the same familiar places. According to one 
survey, 80% of Canadians:  
are likely to return to the same place over and 
over again for a holiday. And eat the same 
dishes. At the same restaurants (Byers, 2013: 
T6).  
Many people make similar attempts at repetition when 
they make, for example, the pilgrimage to Camino de 
Santiago multiple times. What could a person hope to 
gain by this repetition?  
In 1843, the Danish philosopher Soren Kierkegaard 
wondered what could be gained or lost in repetitive 
experience (Kierkegaard, 1983). He attempted to relive 
experiences he once had in Berlin by revisiting haunts 
that he remembered with fondness. After several days, 
he concluded that his attempt at repetition of 
experience was unsuccessful. He was unable to re-
experience the same joys and pleasures of his earlier 
self. 
What prevents successful repetition, suggests 
Kierkegaard, is beginning with the end in mind rather 
than travelling merely to collect random impressions. 
Repetition fails, argues Kierkegaard, when we become 
passive observers of ourselves instead of fully 
immersed in present experience. When one makes 
comparisons with earlier experiences, one adopts a 
passive, objective stance, and our experience becomes 
a kind of experiment rather than a commitment.  
An authentic repetition, he argues, can only happen 
after one surrenders control of events. One must give 
something up to get anything back. To experience 
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required to fill in gaps of a past experience:  
The end of one journey is simply the start of 
another. You have to see what you missed the 
first time, see again what you already saw, see 
in springtime what you saw in summer, in 
daylight what you saw by night, see the sun 
shining where you saw the rain falling, see the 
crops greening, the fruit ripening, the stone 
moved from one place to another, the shadow 
that was not there before. You have to retrace 
your footsteps, either to tread them again, or to 
plant fresh ones alongside them. You have to 
start the journey over. Always (Saramago, 
2000: 443). 
Thus, repetition improves understanding. Each time we 
re-read a book, or view a film twice, our grasp of the 
content deepens. It might even be true that one must 
read a book twice before one can really know it. When 
a musician plays the same tune repeatedly on a violin, 
they gain a deeper understanding of it, in the sense that 
they start to feel it and play it intuitively, rather than 
thinking consciously about what they are doing. 
Similarly, one might need to experience places twice in 
order to know them better. The first time one visits 
London or Paris, one is impressed by every little detail, 
simply because they are unfamiliar. A second visit 
might allow one’s focus to move beyond novel details, 
and reveal a deeper, structural, understanding of the 
bare bones of the place. Pilgrims walking the same 
pilgrim trail repetitively will gain a deeper appreciation 
of local history, flowers and birds, and the 
philosophical insights specific to walking. 
By returning to a place, and finding familiarity in the 
stores, restaurants and walks, one can make the new 
place feel like home. One feels less like a tourist when 
one recognizes the landscape and does not need 
directions. This increased understanding comes at a 
cost however. By making the exotic more familiar, one 
must give up the magic of newness. 
2) Ritual 
Repetition can be devotional. The film critic Roger 
Ebert wrote in his memoirs that he was always seeking 
to repeat experiences on his travels, and he likened it to 
a sacred ritual: 
I’ve been back to the café several times again, 
always hoping for the same seat at the same 
table. Such returns are an important ritual to 
me (Ebert, 2011: 135).  
Constantin Constantius, the pseudonym used by 
Kierkegaard in this story, has fond memories of 
experiencing Berlin churches by moonlight. He can 
still visualize the act of climbing the stairs to his old 
flat, which he has ascended countless times again in his 
memory, towards the gas-lit entry. He yearns to 
actually repeat these experiences, and so he returns to 
Berlin, rents the same apartment with the same 
furniture from the same landlord, and visits the same 
haunts of his earlier self. He arrives excited to find 
things pretty much the same - a glass door, a writing 
table, an armchair upholstered in red velvet - and 
enthused about his likely success. It doesn’t take long, 
however, for him to discover that not all things in 
Berlin are as static as his old furniture. Taking coffee 
in the local café doesn’t make his spirits soar as it used 
to. His landlord is not as much fun to talk to because, 
instead of rakishly singing the praises of his 
bachelorhood, he now congratulates himself on his 
sedate married life. After several days of visiting 
theatres, sitting in the same seats, and returning to 
restaurants that he had frequented daily in his earlier 
life, he concludes that a repetition of his experience is 
impossible, and wearily returns home. 
Three Reasons for Repetition: Emphasis, 
Ritual, Imitation 
So why do travellers repeat journeys they have made 
before? With our limited life, is it not better to escape 
routine, and to take risks that come with being open to 
new experiences, rather than repeating things a second 
time?  
1) Emphasis 
Kierkegaard suggests that the act of repetition can 
produce emphasis, such as when a speaker repeats the 
same phrases in order to signify their importance, or 
bangs their hand on the table over and over again. 
(Kierkegaard, 1983) Perhaps, similarly, the tourist 
wishes to emphasize fading memories by rehearsing 
them over again anew in order to deepen the 
impressions. For example, Andre Gidé writes of his 
protagonist Michel in The Immoralist, that by returning 
to Spain he was hoping to: 
rediscover [his memories of] a purer sky, of 
sharper shadows, of . . . laughter and song 
(Gide, 1970: 12). 
José Saramago discusses the act of repetition in one of 
his notebooks on travel, and implies that repetition is 
  
attempt to experience what they failed to experience 
the first time. This is especially true on the Camino de 
Santiago, where one hears many hyperbolic stories 
about aligning yourself with the stars, being at one 
with the universe, finding the extraordinary in the 
ordinary, and learning ‘lessons’ on life. One can feel 
cheated, or inadequate if these experiences are not 
actually manifested. This lack can be felt in any tourist 
experience, of say, Paris’ Left Bank where impossibly 
romantic expectations are built up. If the pilgrim 
cannot become the transformed person they have heard 
about, there is a strong temptation to fake it simply by 
mimicking the motions and imitating those who came 
before. 
What has gone wrong, suggests Kierkegaard, is that 
they have begun with the end in mind. It is rather like 
what happens to the traveller who travels merely ‘to 
smell what everybody else has smelled’ (Kierkegaard, 
1983: 153). Such people see only the iconic sights, and 
follow a guide book rigidly in order to experience 
approved activities. They have routine itineraries, and 
prescribed responses to experiences. He similarly 
criticizes theatre goers who only attend a performance 
if they know in advance what will happen, and if it has 
been pre-approved by the opinions of others. 
To illustrate his point, Kierkegaard uses an analogy of 
a young lover whose ‘mistake was that he stood at the 
end instead of at the beginning’ (Kierkegaard, 1983: 
137). Because of this mistake, the role of the actual 
woman with whom he was in love was, in fact, 
superfluous. She was merely the proxy used to awaken 
in him poetic feelings of love that he wanted. He 
wanted to be in love, but with whom he was in love did 
not seem to really matter. His love fails because is 
merely a pretence. Analogously, if a pilgrim begins a 
journey with the specific aim of imitating others, they 
will never reach that target. 
Tourists often try on identities and roles. In attempts to 
behave the way they think movie stars behave, they 
indulge in luxury, conspicuous consumption, and status 
seeking. For a time, they pretend that luxury hotels and 
trendy locations are their natural habitat. This 
unnecessary link between luxury and tourism is fixed 
in the minds of many. People who live frugally in their 
day to day lives often feel compelled to spend lavishly 
when they visit Paris. Cruises are sold on their image 
of romanticism and luxury from a previous era. Paul 
Fussell notes that the motive of much tourism: 
Haller Kierkegaard’s ‘Repetition’ And Pilgrimage  
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Much of religious experience is expressed through 
repetition. The repetition of phrases over and over 
again, or the repetition of steps on a pilgrimage, can 
mimic cyclical and eternal natural rhythms such as the 
cycles of morning, day and night, of the work day, of 
the seasons, of life and death, of breathing, and heart 
rate. This ‘repetition,’ writes Luc Ferry: 
guarantees that they cannot be forgotten . . . 
[and this] . . . achieves a kind of 
‘immortality’ (Ferry, 2011: 35). 
3) Imitation 
Repetition, by its very nature, is second-hand, and this 
can have negative connotations. Rebecca Solnit, in 
Wanderlust, notes that sacred pilgrimages are defined 
by repetition and imitation of those who came before:  
To follow a route, [she writes] is to accept an 
interpretation, or to stalk your predecessors . . . 
To walk the same way is to reiterate something 
deep, to move through the same space the same 
way is a means of becoming the same person, 
thinking the same thoughts (Solnit, 2001: 68). 
This can be a good thing, as following in the footsteps 
of others can be a way of emulating admirable role 
models in the hopes of forging the same virtues in 
oneself. The Ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle 
famously emphasized this benefit of repetition. He 
argued that one’s character is shaped by what one 
repeatedly does. Virtue, he notes, is created by 
repetitive habit, not particular actions. So, by repeating 
the same behaviour we reinforce our characters and 
change them into something desirable. (Adler, 1997) 
However, imitation of others is also famously derided 
by existentialist philosophers as being inauthentic. 
Nietzsche in Beyond Good and Evil (1885), 
admonishes those who follow the ‘herd’ (Scruton et al., 
2010). Kierkegaard advises that authenticity requires 
making one’s own decisions rather than following the 
same path as others (Collins, 1968). Sartre claims that 
it is ‘bad faith’ to adopt the ways and accepted beliefs 
of others rather than fearlessly facing one’s radical 
freedo. (Detmer, 2008). Thus, there is a danger of 
counterfeit mimicry in repetition of experience. 
Repeat pilgrims on the Camino de Santiago run the risk 
of being trapped in such inauthenticity. They might not 
be attempting to nostalgically re-live their previous 
experiences, as desperately trying to experience what 
they expected to the first time around, but failed. A 
compulsion to do things twice might sometimes be an 
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whatever unfolds. In this way, he would need to 
surrender his objective stance of a passive viewer and 
‘reporter’ of events, which was needed for 
comparisons with earlier experiences. Instead, he 
would be actively engaged, and thus able to actually re
-experience something like what happened before. One 
must experience things directly, through active 
decision making, in contrast to passively ‘recollecting’ 
past events, which leads to frustration, since 
experiences cannot actually be duplicated. Kierkegaard 
advises that a ‘repetition’ is not a temporary 
experiment but, rather, is a renewed commitment to 
live repeatedly in the present. So, repetition is, 
paradoxically, not about the past but about ‘the 
earnestness of existence’ (Kierkegaard, 1983: 133). 
The English author and essayist Julian Barnes uses this 
very language when describing Edith Wharton’s 
attitude towards tourism while motoring around France 
in 1907. For Wharton, tourism is not ‘like some 
version of wine tasting,’ nor a ‘mere aesthetic 
diversion.’ (Barnes, 2002: 65) As Barnes writes: 
She is, indeed, that rare and oxymoronic thing, 
the wise tourist . . . Tourism for her is . . . not 
passive but constructive, re-creative (Barnes, 
2002: 65).  
It is the re-creation that makes repetition possible. 
Repetition fails, argues Kierkegaard, when it is tried as 
some kind of experiment rather than a commitment. 
We cannot half-heartedly ‘try it out’ to see how it 
works because this failure of immersion makes us a 
passive observer of ourselves. A committed attempt 
would actually re-create a similar experience. A true 
repetition cannot be observed but only engaged in.  
Sartre also emphasizes the importance of constant re-
creation. In his explanation of radical freedom, he 
makes use of an example involving a gambler that has 
acknowledged his addiction, and has formed the 
intention to never gamble again. The gambler soon 
finds out, however, that he cannot rely on his previous 
resolution. Each moment, the reformed gambler has 
the freedom to backslide on his commitment. To be 
authentic, he must constantly recommit to the goal, by 
rehearsing his fear of the undesirable consequences of 
his behaviour (Detmer, 2008). 
Repeatable vs. Self-Exhausting Pleasures 
It is helpful here to make use of a distinction between 
what John Martin Fischer calls ‘repeatable pleasures’ 
and ‘self-exhausting pleasures.’ (Fischer, 1993) In an 
between the wars . . . [was] . . . to derive secret 
pleasure from posing momentarily as a member 
of a social class superior to one’s own, to play 
the role (Fussell 1980). 
We often travel in order to play a role, to adopt an 
alternate identity, and enter a fantasy world ‘en 
Provence,’ or on the ‘Italian Riviera.’ This imitation of 
life, however, can never be fully engaged in. It will 
always be disappointing because it necessarily involves 
self-consciously observing oneself in the role. 
Kierkegaard describes such behaviour as a mere ‘jest’ 
and trying to ‘be somebody’ (Kierkegaard, 1983: 133). 
Instead of beginning with a pre-decided goal, 
Kierkegaard advises, one should adopt the way of the 
‘careless wanderer’ who travels merely to collect 
random impressions (Kierkegaard, 1983:153). ‘The 
whole thing,’ he writes, ‘is achieved by accidental 
concretion’ (Kierkegaard, 1983) which can only 
happen after one surrenders control of events. 
Authentic Repetition 
The essential thing involved in an authentic repetition, 
argues Kierkegaard, is that one must stop trying so 
hard to achieve it. Kierkegaard’s attempt at repetition 
fails, concludes editor Robert Bretall, ‘because it is an 
attempt and because it is pursued’ (Bretall, 1946:136). 
A main theme in Kierkegaard’s philosophy, is that you 
have to give something up to get it back. He illustrates 
this concept, famously in Fear and Trembling, with an 
analogy to the Old Testament story of Abraham and 
Isaac (Kierkegaard, 1983). When God commanded 
Abraham to sacrifice his only son Isaac, the only way 
to absorb this request was to give up searching for a 
rational explanation for this highest of demands. 
However, and precisely because of this surrender, 
everything was returned to Abraham, and the sacrifice 
was made unnecessary by God’s intervention. 
Similarly, argues Kierkegaard, one must pursue all life 
with such a commitment to accepting whatever 
happens. To love, one must be prepared to give it up. 
Analogously, one could argue, to enjoy a film, one 
must suspend their disbelief. At one level, the viewer 
knows that a cinematic experience is unreal, with 
written dialogue, sets, and actors. However, if the 
viewer is able to successfully surrender themselves to 
the movie, then they will get something back in the 
form of a richer involvement. 
For Kierkegaard to experience Berlin again, he needed 
to give up expectations and surrender himself to 
  
* * * 
In Pamplona, a small town on the Camino trail, 
one will find many people in the café bar Iruna 
- which Hemmingway made famous in The Sun 
Also Rises. On the walls are many amazing 
photos of him at this very bar, but as long as we 
are content to look passively at the photos, we 
will never repeat the experiences depicted in 
the photos. The trick is to somehow get inside 
the photo, and actively participate in the 
experience of drinking at the bar. You must be 
spontaneous rather than deliberate. 
Back on the Camino trail, the season may be 
different - along with the weather, the itinerary, 
and the people you meet. Importantly, the 
walker him / herself will be different. The theme 
of William Boyd’s Any Human Heart, is the 
interesting observation that our past selves are 
so different from the way we are now, that we 
might as well be different people (Boyd, 2002). 
Perhaps we return to places to recover the 
connecting thread between these selves. The 
rhythm of walking renews a sense of calm and 
joyous appreciation of the day. The attitude of 
voluntary simplicity returns as one gets used to 
owning nothing but what can be carried on 
your back. The routine acts of washing socks, 
unrolling the sleeping bag and re-organizing 
the pack are all repeated ceremoniously. As one 
settles in for the night, one is again surrounded 
by bruised and aching bodies in all states of 
undress, and one is thankful for a simple bed 
and a bottom bunk. 
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argument defending the idea that immortality might not 
be as boring as some have suggested, he points out that 
many pleasures bear repeating. Admittedly, eating 
lobster every day, he suggests, might get tiresome. And 
many ‘bucket-list’ type of activities, like climbing a 
mountain just to prove that you can do it, or to check it 
off your list, are ‘self-exhausting.’ They are worth 
doing, but not worth repeating after they are banked. 
Repeatable pleasures, on the other hand, are not 
diminished by their duplication. Such pleasures include 
eating when we are hungry; drinking wine; listening to 
music; exercising one’s body; and seeing great art in 
person.  
We could add to the list of repeatable pleasures those 
pleasures appropriate to pilgrimage; namely, the ritual 
of prayer and meditation of walking. However, the 
completion of the goal upon arriving at a pilgrimage 
destination would be ‘self-exhausting’. It is true that 
one cannot arrive at the cathedral in Santiago de 
Compostella for the first time, twice. The first time is 
an achievement, but subsequent pilgrimages should be 
focused on the repeatable pleasures described above. 
The goal of a pilgrimage should not be narrowly 
focused on its completion, or on imitating the 
experiences of others. Rather, the aim should be to be a 
good pilgrim. In After Virtue, Alisdair MacIntyre 
(2007) distinguishes between internal goods and 
external goods. External goods are those external to a 
practice. For example, he suggests, one can gain 
‘prestige, status and money’ by playing chess. 
However, these goods are external to the practice of 
playing chess itself, and can be acquired by cheating at 
the game, or in other ways than through chess playing.  
Internal goods, by contrast, are those goods that can be 
had only internal to a practice such as chess playing. 
To play the game well and exercise the required skills 
of strategy, etc., is a good internal to the practice, and 
can be acquired in no other way. 
The external goods of pilgrimage are the attainment of 
certificates of completion, bragging rights, and bucket 
list checking. Repetition of these achievements will be 
pointless. Internal goods of pilgrimage are repeatable. 
To travel well, as Kierkegaard suggests, will be to free 
oneself from pre-conceived goals. If one plays the 
game of pilgrimage well, the experience will not be 
diminished by repetition. The aim will not be to get to 
the end, and thus, one is potentially able to achieve the 
goods available only internally to the practice; namely, 
self-discovery and transformation of character through 
the experience of voluntary hardship. 
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